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Disputation of Relevant Facts as set out by Appellee 
Mrs. Case, the Appellee, sets out her "Statement of Relevant Facts", Brief of 
Appellee, pp. 15 - 21. Mr. Case, Appellant, disputes those "facts" as follows: 
1. At 5 5 of her brief, Mrs. Case states that the Judgment of Dissolution 
gave her nothing by way of child support. While she does reference the record and 
the judgment itself, Mr. Case asserts that the judgment speaks for itself and did 
give her a right to child support; specifically a reservation of child support until the 
first of a number of conditions precedent. 
2. At 5 7 of her brief, Mrs. Case asserts as fact that the parties' marital 
settlement agreement was incorporated into the Judgment of Dissolution and that 
the provision addressing change of circumstances was made part thereof. The 
record at 7 - 13, and 82 - 111, shows that the stipulation itself is not a part of the 
Judgment of Dissolution. The provision concerning changed circumstances is not 
part of that judgment. That marital settlement agreement was not part of the record 
upon which the summary judgment was granted; it was not raised by Mrs. Case 
until after that summary judgment was granted and she raised it only in her re-
sponse to Mr. Case's Motion to Set Aside Judgment. See record at 82 - 111. 
3. Mrs. Case asserts, at J 8, she was forced to accept government assis-
tance and could not continue to support the children on her own. Those allegations 
are not in the record and had not been raised below. Upon information and belief, 
Mr. Case asserts that she was remarried throughout all time periods relevant hereto. 
4. Presumably Mrs. Case simply erred when she asserts the petition was 
filed March, 2002, in fact it was March, 2003. 
5. While it is true Mr. Case was served, record at 16, Mrs. Case asser-
tions of fact at 5 10 of her brief are not in the record and should not be considered 
here. 
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6. Mrs. Case argues general versus special and personal jurisdiction in 5 
11 and it is asserted that the answer speaks for itself, that there has been no deter-
mination of special versus general appearance nor has personal jurisdiction been 
argued herein, and Mr. Case denies such allegations — his answer speaks for itself. 
7. Mrs. Case argues the case in 55 15, 16, and 17 of her facts and Mr. 
Case asserts that he has not argued anything erroneously and there has been no 
such determinations nor findings and that the pleadings referred to therein speak 
for themselves. 
8. Mrs. Case argues again in her facts at 5 18, yet the record shows Mr. 
Case's first Notice to Submit was filed with the trial court on October 20, 2003, 
and indicated that no responsive pleading had been received. In fact, Mrs. Case's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment 
was mailed the day before that first notice to submit, record at 94; obviously those 
pleadings crossed in the mail.. 
9. In 55 19 - 23 Mrs. Case appears to argue her case under the guise of 
facts. Mr. Case asserts that the documents referred to in those paragraphs speak for 
themselves. 
10. Specifically addressing claims raised by Mrs. Case in 5 23, Mr. Case 
asserts the first notice to submit clearly shows there was no responsive pleading 
from Mrs. Case (that notice was timely filed on October 20, 2003, despite Mrs. 
Case's assertions of its mail date). The court having received Mrs. Case's respon-
sive pleading knew that it had not reached Mr. Case's counsel, for it was not listed 
on the notice to submit, and the court should not have made any decision without 
opportunity for Mr. Case to respond under rule 4-501, Utah Code of Judicial Ad-
ministration. Mr. Case had five days from service of that responsive pleading to 
file his rebuttal without regard to a prior notice to submit. 
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ARGUMENT; 
Point One; Does a Utah District Court lack subject matter jurisdiction to 
modify the provisions of a California Judgment of Dissolution addressing 
child support when the Petitioner is a resident of Utah and the Respondent is 
not a resident of Utah and is no longer a resident of California? 
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: 
In her brief, Mrs. Case adds to this issue the additional statement "but is 
subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah." Personal jurisdiction is not the issue 
raised here. Subject matter jurisdiction exists independent from personal jurisdic-
tion. 
Throughout her brief, Mrs. Case appears to confuse and intertwine personal 
jurisdiction with subject matter jurisdiction; she seems to argue that the gain of 
personal jurisdiction automatically bestows subject matter jurisdiction. "The con-
ception of jurisdiction of courts is generally split up into two branches Jurisdiction 
over the subject matter and jurisdiction over the parties. To properly act in a case, 
a court must be vested with both jurisdictions." 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §105 
(citations omitted). 
"Jurisdiction of the 'subject matter' is the power of a court to hear and 
determine cases of a general class to which the action in question be-
longs. A court's jurisdiction of the subject matter in a divorce case ex-
ists when a constitution or statute confers upon that court the power to 
adjudge a divorce. It is more than a power to act upon a particular 
state of facts; it is the power to act upon the abstract question and to 
determine whether the particular facts call for the exercise of the ab-
stract power." 
24 Am Jur 2d, Divorce and Separation, § 232 (citations omitted). 'The courts have 
no common-law jurisdiction to grant a divorce. Jurisdiction to grant a divorce does 
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not exist unless it has been conferred by constitution or statute." Id. 
On the other hand, "[tjhat a court has 'jurisdiction of a party' means either 
that the party has appeared generally and submitted to the jurisdiction, that he has 
otherwise waived service of process, or that process has properly issued and been 
served upon him." 20 Am Jur 2d, Courts §105 (citations omitted). 
Based upon these precepts, the Utah trial court needs to have both subject 
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction to proceed. It is the lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction that Mr. Case raises in this appeal; he is not arguing that the trial 
court lacks personal jurisdiction. 
Mrs. Case is correct when she states that in Utah the district court has 
"original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this constitution or by 
statute." Utah Const. Art VIII. Judicial Department, § 5. In Utah, the district 
courts have been granted the power to hear and grant divorces as well as orders 
modifying decrees of divorce by statute, specifically §30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended). 
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, UIFSA, does limit that jurisdic-
tion. Under UIFSA there is the policy of one order, one time, one place and con-
sistent therewith only one court is authorized to establish or modify a child support 
order at a time. UIFSA § 205 provides 
"A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with 
the law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child 
support order 
(a) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the 
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order is 
issued; or 
(b) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written 
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state to 
modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction." 
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Section 78-45f-205, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
However, when, as in the instant case, a foreign decree is sought to be modi-
fied in Utah §§78-45f-611 and 78-45f-613, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), 
control. Utah's §78-45f-611, Modification of child support order of another state, 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended) says: 
"Modification of child support order of another state 
(1) After a child support order issued in another state has been 
registered in this state, the responding tribunal of this state may mod-
ify that order only if Section 78-45f-6l3 does not apply and after no-
tice and hearing it finds that: 
fa) the following requirements are met: (i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not re-
side in the issuing state; (ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state seeks modifi-
cation; and (iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the 
tribunal of this state; or 
(b) the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the 
personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties 
who are individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal 
for a tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume 
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the is-
suing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or estab-
lished procedures substantially similar to the procedures under this 
chapter, the consent otherwise required of an individual residing in 
this state is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to 
modify the child support order." 
§78-45f-611 Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
The exception noted above, §78-45f-613, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended), addresses jurisdiction to modify a child support order of another state 
when all individual parties reside in this state. As Mr. Case does not reside in 
Utah this exception does not apply here. See §78-45f-613(l), Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended). 
Arnold H. Rutkin, 5 Family Law and Practice, § 48 (Matthew Bender & 
Co., Inc. 1997), the authority cited by Mrs. Case, sets out an entire subsection enti-
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tied "Registration and Modification"; Rutkin, Family Law and Practice 
§48.03(8)(d), 48-80, a copy of which is attached in the appendix for the benefit of 
the court. Citing § 611 of UIFSA, Rutkin states that 
"[wlhere the individual parties and the child have left the issuing state, 
or if the individual parties agree in writing to take the case to another 
state, UIFSA sets out a methodology for registering the support order 
in another state for purposes of modification- While either tide obligor 
or obligee may seek a modification of the order, modification must oe 
sought in the jurisdiction of the opposing party." 
Rutkin, Family Law and Practice §48.03(8)(d), 48-80 - 48-81. 
Mrs. Case filed her petition to register her California Judgment of Dissolu-
tion and modify that California Judgment. Record at 4. She complied with the 
registration portion of subparagraph (1) of §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. (1953, 
as amended). In order to proceed, "the responding tribunal of this state may mod-
ify that order only if Section 78-45f-613 does not apply and after notice and hear-
ing it finds that: (a) the following requirements are met" (subparagraph b, is in the 
alternative, and does not apply as the parties have not filed written consents in 
California). 
We now turn to those subparagraph "a" requirements of § 78-45f-61L Mrs. 
Case has met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(l); "the child, the individual 
obligee, and the obligor do not reside in the issuing state". Mrs. Case may ar-
guably have met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(3), "the respondent is 
subject to the personal jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state". But, Mrs. Case has 
not met the requirements of subparagraph (l)(a)(2), "a petitioner who is a nonresi-
dent of this state seeks modification". Nor can she; Mrs. Case, the petitioner, is not 
a "nonresident of this state". 
As such, the trial court erred in granting a judgment. The trial court did not 
follow its statutory authority in having a hearing, after notice, to determine if it had 
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subject matter jurisdiction. Had the trial court complied with §78-45f-611 and held 
the hearing, it would have seen that Mrs. Case, while being the petitioner, is not a 
"non-resident". As such the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction- The trial 
court cannot act. 
Mrs. Case attempts to distinguish State of Utah v. Child Support Enforce-
ment, 888 P.2d 690 (Utah App, 1994), arguing terminology, specifically whether 
her Judgment of Dissolution issued from a circuit court or district court. Brief of 
Appellee at 25-26. While it is true that her judgment issued from the Superior 
Court, Stanislaus County, California, a California superior court which may or may 
not be the equivalent to our district court, her analysis seems incorrect. State of 
Utah v. Child Support Enforcement, was cited by Mr. Case for the proposition that 
if a Utah court lacks subject matter jurisdiction the orders of that court are im-
proper and should be vacated. State of Utah v. Child Support Enforcement at 691 -
692. The terminology does not control; it does not matter what the court may be 
called. The deciding factor is whether or not the Utah court has subject matter ju-
risdiction; if not, then its orders must be vacated. 
B. Personal Jurisdiction 
The numerous cases and authorities cited by Mrs. Case in her brief all go to 
personal jurisdiction and do not address subject matter jurisdiction. Mr. Case is not 
in this appeal arguing personal jurisdiction nor has he raised this as a point for 
appeal. 
Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 109 L Ed 2d 631, 
110 S Ct 2105 (1990), determines whether the assertion of personal jurisdiction is 
consistent with due process. Id. J. Scalia notes that in the court below the peti-
tioner challenged personal jurisdiction and that the state "court held it to be 'a valid 
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jurisdictional predicate for in personam'...'". Bumham 495 U.S. at 608,109 L Ed 
2d at 638,110 S Ct at 2109. J. Scalia goes on with his analysis of the development 
of personal jurisdiction including Pennoyer v. Neff, International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, and all of the related progeny of those cases on the issue of personal 
jurisdiction. Bumham, 495 U.S. 608 - 622,109 L Ed 2d at 638 - 647,110 S Ct at 
2109 -2117. J. Scalia holds that due process is satisfied on the issue of personal ju-
risdiction in that case. Bumham 495 U.S. at 622,109 L Ed 2d at 647,110 S Ct at 
2117. No discussion of subject matter jurisdiction, let alone even mention of the 
term "subject matter jurisdiction", has been found by Appellant's counsel or his 
staff in Bumham. 
Also of note, most of the cases cited by Mrs. Case and discussed predate the 
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act; that act having been enacted from 1996 or 
later by the various states. In like matter the Restatement (First) of Conflicts of 
Laws § 457 cited by Mrs. Case was published decades ago (Restatement 2nd 
Conflict of Laws was published in the mid-sixties). As an example of the age of 
that citation, the very next section § 458 states "[[n]o state will directly enforce a 
duty to support created by the law of another state" with the rationale that the duty 
of support is an enforcement of its own public policy. Restatement (First) of Con-
flicts of Laws. That sentiment is an archaic policy which does not comport with 
current legal thinking and a large portion of the UIFSA; UIFSA itself deals, in 
large part, with enforcement of support order by states which are not the state 
which created that support order. 
In actuality dealing with the UIFSA, Mrs. Case does cite Rutkin's treatise, 
specifically §48.03(a), 48-38, raising the one-state, two-state argument. Rutkin, 
Family Law and Practice, states that "UIFSA also contains a one-state enforce-
ment mechanism commonly referred to as direct withholding. For cases falling 
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beyond a state's long-arm jurisdiction, UIFSA offers the equivalent to the familiar 
URESA two-state proceeding" Supra at 48-39. 
In reading the section of cited by Mrs. Case, Rutkin is discussing enforce-
ment of child support orders in this section of his tome; modification of child sup-
port orders is discussed in a separate section, see Rutkin, Family Law and Practice, 
§48.03(8)(d), 48-80. As the one-state concept is "direct withholding" or enforce-
ment of an order that concept does not apply to the instant matter which is a modi-
fication. Therefore the instant matter cannot be a one-state matter. And, as § 78-
27-24, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), Utah's long-arm statute does not 
apply, the instant matter is one of those "all other cases" which fall into the two-
state category. Id, Rutkin's a Family Law and Practice, by the section cited by 
Mrs. Case, makes the instant matter a two-state type of case contrary to Mrs. 
Case's assertions that it is not. 
Mrs. Case takes this one-state, two-state, analysis to Dept. of Human Ser-
vices v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 363 Utah Adv. Rep. 23, 1999 UT App 52 (Utah 
App. 1999) and concludes that Jacoby was a two-state matter and asserts that the 
instant case is a one-state matter and as such §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended), does not apply. Yet Jacoby does not use the terms one-state 
or two-state and Rutkin, Family Law and Practice, does not make any such dis-
tinction under his modification analysis. 
Mrs. Case does agree that Jacoby involved an attempted modification of a 
foreign decree in Utah, see Brief of Appellee p. 30, just as in the instant case. In 
Jacoby it was a Virginia decree which became a Pennsylvania decree. Jacoby at 
941. In the instant case, it is a California Judgment of Dissolution. Record at 7. In 
Jacoby, the husband, in response to Pennsylvania's attempt to enforce a child sup-
port order in Utah, filed a petition to modify his child support. Jacoby at 941. In 
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the instant case Mrs. Case filed a Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree 
and Modification of Decree with the goal of modifying child support. Record at 5. 
Mrs. Case accepts that Jacoby was a two-state matter and §78-45f-611 properly 
applied, Brief of Appellee at 32, yet argues without support that the instant case is 
not a two-state matter and as such §75-45f-611 does not apply. Mrs. Case also 
distinguishes Gentzel v. Williams, 965 P.2d 855 (Kan. App, 1998) which involved 
a husband in Kansas seeking to modify an Arizona decree when the wife had 
moved and relocated to Texas. 
Factually, there is no difference between the instant case and Jacoby or 
Gentzel. All three cases involve the modification of a decree of divorce from state 
"A" on the issue of child support where the husband had moved to state "B" and 
the wife and child moved to state "C". Section 611 of the UIFSA applies and the 
person seeking the modification must be a "non-resident" of the state in which the 
modification is sought in order to proceed. Using Rutkin's language, all three 
cases are two-state cases and under Rutkin, Family LMW and Practice, UIFSA §611 
applies. Mr. Case suggests that Mrs. Case's analysis of Jacoby, Gentzel, and 
Rutkin, Family IMW and Practice, are in error. Section 78-45f-611 applies to the 
instant case and the outcome here should be the same as in Jacoby, dismissal of 
Mrs. Case's claims for modification of child support due to lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction; personal jurisdiction is not relevant. See, Jacoby at 946. 
C Use of UCCJEA as a basis for modification of child support: 
Mr. Case, in his brief, did raise the point that the only statutory authority 
cited to the trial court by Mrs. Case was Utah's UCCJEA, §§ 78-45c-100 - 318, 
Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
Mrs. Case argues that such a citation was proper, or at least harmless error. See 
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Brief of Appellee at 32-33. In support of her argument, Mrs. Case cites Mc-
Cormick v. McCormick, 623 SW2d 909 (Kentucky 1981). 
McCormick involved a petition to modify a decree of divorce on this issue of 
child support where the decree had issued in Kentucky with the husband having 
moved to Georgia and the wife to Louisiana subsequent thereto. Id. 
McCormick predates UIFSA by quite a number of years and clearly stated 
that it had no statute addressing jurisdiction for the modification of child support 
like it did for modification of child custody. The Kentucky Supreme Court used 
the child custody statute as "instructive guidelines for determining this state's in-
terest in assuming jurisdiction." McCormick, 623 S.W.2d at 910. 
Ultimately the decision in McCormick parallels §611 of UIFSA. In finding 
that "[bjoth states have significant contact with or interest in one or more of the 
parties" the court held that "it does violate traditional notions of fair play and sub-
stantial justice to require that the appellant [husband] submit repeatedly to the ju-
risdiction of a Kentucky court for determination of an issue in which his state of 
residency or domicile has a great interest.,..". McCormick, 623 S.W.2d at 910. 
Under McCormick, Mrs. Case should have gone to Mr. Case's "state of residency 
or domicile" to modify child support. 
However, presently Utah does have its UIFSA, and Mrs. Case admits that 
she never informed the court of that statute or its application to her case. Brief of 
Appellee at 33. All counsel appearing before a tribunal are charged with informing 
the court of authority which may be adverse to that counsel's position. Mrs. Case's 
failure to inform the trial court of §78-45f-611 may very well be error, but it is for 
this court to determine whether or not that error is harmless. Had she done so, this 
appeal and all costs attendant thereto may well have been avoided. 
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Point Two: Absent subject matter jurisdiction can the District court enter 
summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(e) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure? 
Mrs. Case cites numerous cases to support her proposition that summary 
judgment was properly granted. Mr. Case will concede that those cases stand for 
the proposition that absent some filings or pleadings responsive to a motion for 
summary judgment that "summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him." Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). All 
cases cited by Mrs. Case include the words "if appropriate". 
It is that "if appropriate" which Mr. Case brings forward. Under the facts of 
this case where Mrs. Case, the petitioner below, specifically pleads a request that 
the trial court communicate with California to determine whether or not Utah is the 
proper forum for the modification. Record at 5. From the very beginning Mrs. 
Case, her counsel, and the court are all on notice of a foreign order and jurisdic-
tional issues. Id. (While the exact language of the petition addresses "venue", the 
use of "venue" in the same sentence as communicating with the court of another 
state the plain reading would indicate a question of jurisdiction; it is suggested that 
Mrs. Case simply used the wrong word.) In that light, a summary judgment is in-
appropriate. The court and the parties were on notice of the need, and Mrs. Case's 
request, for communications with a court of another state on the issue of modifica-
tion of that other state's child support orders. 
With that notice and the requirements of §78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended), which requires notice and a hearing for factual determinations 
of the three requirements set out in that statute, a grant of summary judgment could 
not enter. Statute required factual determinations after a hearing, which did not oc-
cur. 
Mrs. Case does argue for strict application of law under Rule 56, Utah Rules 
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of Civil Procedure. See pp. 33 - 37, Brief of Appellee. Under the facts of the 
case, the trial court was made aware by Mrs. Case of questionable subject matter 
jurisdiction. "[Qjuestions regarding subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at 
any time because such issues determine whether a court has authority to address 
the merits of a particular case." Housing Authority of Salt Lake v. Snyder, 2002 UT 
28 at 5 11,44 P.3d 724,727 (Utah, 2002). "[Sjubject matter jurisdiction is an issue 
that can and should be addressed sua sponte when jurisdiction is questionable." 
Petersen v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 907 P.2d 1148,1151 (Utah 1995). 
Furthermore, the defense of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. 
Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Therefore the strict application of law is that the trial court could not enter 
summary judgment. Absent subject matter jurisdiction, the trial court may not 
enter summary judgment; for such an act is not appropriate. And where as in the 
instant case, subject matter was questionable, it should have been addressed sua 
sponte by the trial court. 
Mrs. Case argues that her exclusive use of the UCCJEA as a jurisdictional 
basis was not improper or error for reversal despite the fact that she agrees that 
UIFSA controls. See Brief of Appellee at 31 - 36. Rule 3.3, Candor toward the 
tribunal, Rules of Professional Conduct, requires disclosure of legal authority in 
the controlling jurisdiction known to the lawyer to be directly adverse to the posi-
tion of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel, or in this case the oppos-
ing party as Mr. Case was appearing pro se. Mrs. Case, while now admitting that 
UIFSA controls did not raise that jurisdictional issue nor that statutory act. It can 
be presumed that she and her counsel did research the issue and were, or should 
have been, aware of §78-45f-611; yet she did not even raise it for the court's con-
sideration. 
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Point Three: May the trial court in Utah modify a child support order with-
out any showing of a substantial change in circumstances? 
Mrs. Case admits, as a generality, that a showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances is required before a court may modify a support order. Brief of Ap-
pellee at 38. She argues though, that when, as in the instant, child support is re-
served until the occurrence of some condition precedent that this generality does 
not apply. Id. 
First, it is important to note exactly what the Superior Court, Stanislaus 
County, California, ordered. The Judgment of Dissolution states "[tjhis judgment 
contains provisions for child support or family support." {see Judgment of Disso* 
lution, 5 4.h., Record at 7) and that "[e]hild support is ordered as set forth in the at-
tached ... Marital settlement agreement, stipulation for judgment, or other written 
order... Other (specify): See Attachment 4o.", {see Judgment of Dissolution, $ 4.1. 
Record at 8). The pertinent part of Attachment 4.o, the provisions concerning child 
support at 5 2, states: 
"2. CHILD SUPPORT: The issue of child support shall be re-
served until the first of the following events: 
a. The children attain the age of 18, and are not full-time 
high school students residing with a parent or until the time the children 
complete the 12th grade or attain the age of 19 years; 
b. The children die; 
c. The children enter into a valid marriage, are on active 
duty with any of the armed forces of the United States of America or receive 
a declaration of emancipation under California law; 
d. Further order of the court." 
Recordatl l-12. 
Secondly, the Marital Settlement Agreement, referred to by Mrs. Case, see 
Brief of Appellee at 40-42, was not incorporated into the California Judgment of 
Dissolution as Mrs. Case asserts; nor was it entered in the record before the trial 
court until after Mr. Case filed his Motion for Relief from Judgment. It was only 
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entered before the trial court as an attachment to Mrs, Case's Memorandum in Op-
position to Respondent's Motion for Relief from Judgment. Record at 82 - 111, 
specifically 95-111. Therefore that agreement is not part of the Judgment of Dis-
solution nor was it before the Utah trial court at the time it made its initial grant of 
summary judgment. 
In support of her proposition that a showing of substantial change in cir-
cumstances is not required, Mrs. Case cites § 78-45-7.2(3), Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended). Section 78-45-7.2 is titled "Application of guidelines — 
Rebuttable" and states, in part: 
"[tjhe rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations re-
quired by the guidelines, the award amounts resulting from the application of 
the guidelines, and the use of worksheets consistent with these guidelines are 
presumed to be correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of this section." 
Section 78-45-7.2(2)(b). 
Section 78-45-7.2(3) states: 
"[a] written finding or specific finding on the record supporting the conclu-
sion that complying with a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award 
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be unjust, inappropriate, 
or not in the best interest of a child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut 
the presumption in that case. If an order rebuts the presumption through 
findings, it is considered a deviated order." 
The plain language of the statute shows only that the court may deviate from 
the use of child support guidelines in ordering an award amount. It does not grant 
the trial court the power to ignore the required showing of a substantial change in 
circumstances in order to modify a child support order. 
Mrs. Case next argues that her case is unique because the Judgment of Dis-
solution "reserved" the issue of child support until the occurrence of one of four 
conditions precedent and that as the California court made no factual findings on 
income, employment or related issues, there is nothing from which to show a sub-
is 
stantiai change of circumstances. Brief of Appellee at 38-40. In support of that 
assertion, she cites Ebel v. Brown, 246 N.W.2d 379 (Mich App. 1976). 
Ebel is distinguishable on the facts and in law. Ebel involved a situation 
where the child support was the "sum of $-none- per month..." and the mother 
signed an affidavit releasing the father from "any and all support for the two minor 
children." Ebel at 380. In addition, the Michigan court stated that, apparently as a 
matter of law, "in wholly Michigan divorces, where a decree does not provide for 
child support, maintenance may later be decreed regardless of whether a change in 
circumstances has occurred." Ebel at 381 (citations omitted). 
In the instant case child support was not set to "none" and Mrs. Case did not 
release child support. Instead, she agreed to reserve it until the occurrence of one 
of four events. And, in Utah, the Michigan doctrine cited in Ebel does not exist. 
Ebel is inapplicable in Utah. This court has at various times "filled in the 
blanks" when factual issues appear difficult. A case in point is Johansen v. Jo-
hansen, 443 Utah Adv. Rep. 22,2002 UT App 75,45 P.3d 520 (Utah App. 2002). 
Johansen involved automatic reduction of child support in a situation where the 
decree was entered prior to the enactment of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.10 (Supp. 
2001) (Automatic Adjustment Statute). Johansen, 45 P.3d at 521. In resolution 
of the problem, this court ordered that the trial court use the income of the parties 
at the time of the decree and that the parties were to submit tax returns or related 
documents if the income was not listed in the findings, order or worksheets. Jo-
hansen, 45 P.3d at 523 - 524. Such option is easily available in the instant case and 
no special exception to the substantial change in circumstances needs to be created. 
Mrs. Case further argues that the court should look to the intent of the parties 
for guidance and input on changed circumstances, Brief of Appellee at p. 41; Mr. 
Case agrees and that would be a very definite starting place for an evidentiary 
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hearing consistent with Johansen This proposition of Mrs. Case in and of itself 
contradicts her earlier argument, at p. 39 of her brief, that there is no starting point 
from which to determine a change. 
That starting point is available to the trial court. The California matter was 
settled by stipulation. Each party presumably gave up something in consideration 
for the final settlement; and that is exactly Mr. Case's point. He and Mrs. Case 
agreed to reserve child support until the occurrence of some future event, the first 
of the three enumerated events. Each presumably gave up somiething; and each of 
these two parties were represented by counsel so they knowingly made that agree-
ment. That settlement has value in and of itself and to now modify it requires the 
same investigation as any other change in an order on child support in Utah. 
Mrs. Case then again argues matters outside of the record; the marital set-
tlement agreement. See Brief of Appellee, p. 41. As pointed out earlier in this 
document, that agreement is not part of the Judgment of Dissolution. That docu-
ment was not in the record prior to the judge's decision to grant summary judgment 
and Mr. Case filing his Motion to Set Aside Judgment. Record at 82 - 111. It first 
appeared in this matter in Mrs. Case's response to that motion to set aside. Record 
at 95 - 111. As such, it was not a basis nor even available to the judge for his deci-
sion, though it may provide that starting point for an investigation of what the cir-
cumstances were and what changes occurred since that time at the trial level. In-
quiries which should have been made, and additional argument for Mr. Case's 
proposition that summary judgment without showing material changed circum-
stances is reversible error. 
On this issue, should this court consider the marital stipulation, Mrs. Case 
knew, with the advise of counsel, that at the time of the signing of that stipulation 
that the child support to be set was below the mandatory minimum level. Mr. Case 
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would assert that reserving child support is certainly below the mandatory mini-
mum level in California at the time of the signing of that document. As such, 
which provision controls? Mr. Case asserts that this is a question for factual de-
terminations and findings and as that provision was not included in the Judgment 
of Dissolution, it is not part of the final judgment. Mrs. Case was represented by 
counsel; it was her counsel that prepared those documents and the attachment to 
the Judgment for Dissolution, see Record at 7 - 13; and, Mrs. Case should be 
estopped from challenging such documentation. 
As to Mrs. Case's final argument in this section, Mrs. Case goes into an 
emotional appeal and, Mr. Case would say, personally denigrating argument. In 
brief response, Mr. Case asserts that Mrs. Case knew what she was signing, that all 
of her assertions contained therein are outside the record below, that he, Mr. Case, 
gave up valuable rights in making that original settlement, and, upon information 
and belief, Mrs. Case had been remarried the entire time pertinent to the instant 
matter having remarried in March, 2003. 
Point Four: Attorney Fees: 
Mrs. Case raises, as a separate point, the issue of attorney fees. She raises 
§30-3-3. Utah Code Annot (1953, as amended) in support of her assertion that she 
should be awarded her fees and costs. She is correct in citing that section as a basis 
for an award of attorney fees and costs and §30-3-5, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as 
amended) and Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also may allow such an 
award. But, she is incorrect in her assertions that Mr. Case's arguments are erro-
neous or frivolous. Brief of Appellee at 42. This court has already ruled on Mrs. 
Case's assertions that the appeal is frivolous or otherwise improper in its order 
denying Mrs. Case's Rule 10 Motion for Summary Disposition. See Order dated 
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February 10,2004. 
Mrs. Case may be entitled to such an award under statute, if this court so 
finds such an award to be appropriate. However, Mr. Case has raised a very basic 
point of jurisprudence in this appeal: Subject matter jurisdiction, which can be 
raised at any time. See, Barnard v. Wassermann, 855 P.2d 243, 248 (Utah, 1993) 
(holding that challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time 
and cannot be waived by the parties). See also, Utah Dep't of Bus. Reg., 602 P.2d 
696, 699 (Utah, 1979) (holding that parties may not waive subject matter jurisdic-
tion). 
As the trial court did not have subject matter jurisdiction, perhaps in part due 
to Mrs. Case's failure to cite Utah's UIFSA 78-45M00 - 902, Utah Code Annot. 
(1953, as amended) Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), see Brief of Appellee, 
p. 32 - 35 (wherein Mrs. Case admits she did not inform the trial court of this 
statute and further, now agrees in her brief, that UIFSA is controlling), instead di-
recting the court in a different direction, specifically Utah's UCCJEA, id, the trial 
court could not act. Mr. Case is proper in his actions challenging that error and 
suggests to this court that if either of the two parties should be awarded attorney 
fees and costs, it is he as he is asserting a well settled matter of jurisprudence. For 
"[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to determine a 
controversy and without which it cannot proceed. Fishery. Fisher, 67 P.3d 1055, 
1058 (Utah App. 2003). 
Conclusion: 
Despite all of the protestations, references, and citations set forth in Mrs. 
Case's Brief of Appellee, the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to mod-
ify a California Judgment of Dissolution of a marriage on the issue of child support 
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as requested by Appellee in her Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree and 
Modification of Decree filed in the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 
Sevier County, State of Utah, on March 24, 2003. Lacking subject matter jurisdic-
tion, the Ruling on Motion for Summary Judgment entered by that district court in 
favor of Appellee on September 10,2003, is void and needs to be set aside. 
While Appellee cites numerous cases and secondary authority, the vast ma-
jority of such all were created before the drafting, adoption and implementation of 
the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, in Utah, §§ 78-45M00 - 902, Utah 
Code Annot. (1953, as amended). 
Appellee agrees with Appellant that Utah district court have general jurisdic-
tion except as limited by the State's Constitution or statute. Utah Const. Art VIII. 
Judicial Department, § 5. Appellee also agrees with Appellant that the Uniform 
Interstate Family Support Act is adopted in Utah is controlling. Brief of Appellee 
at 33-35. 
Part 6, Enforcement and modification of support order after registration, of 
Title 78 Chapter 45F, Utah Code Annot. (1953, as amended), deals specifically 
with the facts of this case; a support order issued by a tribunal of another state 
sought to be modified in this state. Section 78-45f-611, Utah Code Annot. (1953, 
as amended), enumerates three requirements that must be met before the Utah trial 
court can modify that order and Appellee fails the second requirement; Appellee, 
who seeks the modification, is not a "non-resident of this state....". Id. 
As such, Utah's Uniform Interstate Family Support Act is a statutory limita-
tion on the general jurisdiction of the trial court. The trial court "may modify that 
order only if... after notice and hearing it finds that..." those three requirements 
are met. 78-45f-611. The trial court did not hold that hearing. The trial court 
could not find that all three requirements are met. fhe trial court did not luue 
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subject matter jurisdiction. 
Appellee argues that because she obtained personal jurisdiction over Appel-
lant, the trial court acquired subject matter jurisdiction. It is well established 
though that the parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the court by 
agreement or otherwise if the court does not have it. Therefore Appellee's argu-
ments about personal jurisdiction do not apply. 
Appellee also argues that the summary judgment was proper under rule be-
cause of Appellant's failure to respond. While arguing for strict legal enforcement 
of Rule 56, she fails to address or appreciate the limitation set out in that rule; the 
words "if appropriate". Lacking subject matter jurisdiction, which was first 
brought into question by her own Verified Petition for Domestication of Decree 
and Modification of Decree, where Appellee questioned whether the court below 
was the correct court or not asking it to communicate with California, a grant of 
summary judgment was not "appropriate". 
Appellee further asserts that she does not need to show any substantial 
change in circumstance to modify her California Judgment of Dissolution in Utah. 
In support thereof she argues that her case is a special exception because there 
were no initial findings, without any basis for that assertion in law, or that foreign 
case law supports the lack of such a requirement. As shown above, that foreign 
case law is inapplicable here due to differences in law and furthermore Utah has 
ways and means of going back to the time of the initial order to reconstruct the 
facts at that time for a determination of a substantial change in circumstance. Utah 
holds to the requirement that the moving party shows that substantial change in or-
der to proceed with a modification. Appellee needs to comply. 
Those arguments are secondary to the fact that under 78-45f-611, Utah Code 
Annot. (1953, as amended), the trial court does have subject matter jurisdiction. As 
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a result, the trial court cannot act and any judgment or ruling it made must be set 
aside with the action to modify child support being dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this _ L day of May, 2004. 
J l 
DAVID R. HARTWIG, ESQ. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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validity of the order or the administrative remedies is contested, the 
agency must register the order under Article 6 and proceed in that 
manner.159 
[8] Enforcement and Modification of Child Support Orders 
After Registration 
While the registration.process set out in Article 6 appears to be 
similar to RURESA §§ 35-40, there are several critical distinctions. 
RURESA effectively encouraged multiple orders through de novo 
proceedings. Under RURESA, there was also the ever-present worry 
that, once registered, a responding state would modify the obligation 
-generally downward to accommodate the resident obligor. This, too, 
led to multiple orders. UIFSA precludes de novo orders except in very 
limited circumstances,160 Registering for enforcement does not permit 
modification of the registered order unless it is also registered for 
modification and the conditions of the Act are met.161 
Under RURESA, upon registration the court entered a conforming 
order of its own, leading to debate over whether modification of a 
registered order had the res judicata effect of modifying the original 
order.162 Registering under UIFSA authorizes the registering state to 
enforce the issuing state order, not create one of its own.163 The 
issuing state retains continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over modifica-
tion of the order. 
1 5 9
 The child support provisions of welfare reform all states will be required to 
have more extensive administrative authority, including, bank levies, interstate 
recognition of liens against an obligor's real and personal property, and even stronger 
withholding provisions. See PRWORA and § 48.01 [2], supra. 
1 6 0 A new order is presumably permitted when both parties have moved to the 
same state, thus eliminating UIFSA's applicablity, and under § 207(b)(3) when 
multiple orders exist but no state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
But see Full Faith and Credit of Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B. 
161 See UIFSA §§ 603(c), 609 and 611(a)(1). 
162 Compare Monson v. Monson, 271 N.W.2d 137 (Wis. 1978) (a modification 
of the registered order may effect a modification in the rendering state) with White-
Nathan v. Nathan, 888 P.2d 237 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (agreeing with other states' 
interpretation of RURESA and holding that a support order entered by a responding 
California court does not modify the original order established m the Anzona divorce 
decree absent the responding court's express statement otherwise; thus, Arizona was 
not required to grant full faith and credit to the California order). 
163 Compare UIFSA § 603(b) with RURESA § 40(a), 9 U.L.A. at 546 (1987). 
(Maiihcw Bender & Co, Inc) (Rcl.23-10/97 Pub 371) 
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[a] Registration for Enforcement 
Procedurally, registration of either an income-withholding order or 
a support order is streamlined. The Act requires: a transmittal letter 
requesting registration and enforcement; two copies, including one 
certified copy, of all orders to be registered, including any modification 
of an order; the petitioner's sworn statement or a certified statement 
by the custodian of the records showing the amount of any arrears; 
the name, social security number and address of the obligor; the name 
and address of the obligor's employer; any source of income; descrip-
tion and location of any property subject to execution; and the name 
and address of the obligee and to whom payments are to be sent.164 
See Appendix 48C, infra, for UIFSA forms. 
Upon receipt, the registering tribunal must "cause to be filed" the 
order as a foreign judgment, regardless of the form.165 If a remedy 
must be affirmatively sought under state law, a pleading must be filed 
stating with specificity the grounds for the remedy sought. Otherwise, 
no pleading is required.166 
The order is registered when filed and is enforceable in the same 
manner as an order of the registering state.167 As noted above, when 
registered for enforcement, the order may .not be modified.168 
[b] Choice of Law 
The procedure and law of the registering state govern enforcement 
issues, though do not affect the interpretation of the order being 
enforced. For such matters as the nature, extent, amount and duration 
of the support obligation and the payment of arrearages under the 
order, the law of the issuing state controls.169 For instance, UIFSA 
provides that the duration of the obligor's duty is governed by the 
law with original issuing jurisdiction. This is consistent with case 
law170 Although the rules are straightforward, counsel should 
16
* UIFSA § 602(a). 
165 UIFSA § 602(b). 
166
 UIFSA § 602(c). 
167 UIFSA §§ 603(a) and (b). 
is* UIFSA § 603(c). 
169 UIFSA § 604(a). 
170 See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 122 Cal. App. 3d 209, 175 Cal. Rptr. 716 (1981) 
(Missouri's order was entitled to full faith and credit; as such, support was due until 
(Matthew Bender & Co . Inc ) (Rel.23-10/97 Pub 371) 
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anticipate some thorny choice-of-law questions arise while sorting 
through existing multiple orders in order to determine the controlling 
order and which jurisdiction has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction. 
Regarding the applicable limitations period, UIFSA directs the 
registering state to apply the statute of limitations of the issuing state, 
if it is longer.m This appears to be an exception based on a public 
policy choice in favor of enforcing child support debts. 
[c] Contest to Registration 
When either a support order or income-withholding order is regis-
tered, the registering tribunal must notify the non-registering party. 
The notice must be accompanied by a copy of the registered order 
and supporting documents. The notice must recite: the effect of 
registration (i.e., that it is enforceable as of the date of registration 
in the same manner as an order of the registering state); the amount 
of arrears alleged; that failure to file a timely contest will result in 
confirmation not only of the order but also of the alleged arrears, and 
that future contest is precluded; and that a hearing to contest must 
be requested within 20 days after notice.172 
Although not required, it may be advisable to notify the respondent 
that the order being registered is the one the petitioner (whether the 
obligor or the obligee) alleges is controlling for prospective 
enforcement. 
Finally, when registering an income withholding order, the register-
ing tribunal must notify the obligor's employer in the same manner 
as set out in the state's income withholding law.173 
If no contest is filed, the registered order is confirmed by operation 
of law174 and any further contest is precluded, including a challenge 
the child reached the age of majority in Missouri, even though the order was registered 
in California, where the support obligation had ended three years earlier); Gonzalez-
Goengaga v. Gonzaleg, 426 So. 2d 1106 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983). 
i7* UIFSA § 604(b). 
i7^ UIFSA § 605(b). See Mathis v. State, 930 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) (a certified 
copy of a judgement bearing an attestation that the document is a true copy, satisifies 
the authentication requirements of the rules of evidence). 
*
73 UIFSA § 605(c). 
I 7* UIFSA § 606(b). 
(Matthew Bender & Co., Inc ) (ReL23-10/97 Pub 371) 
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to the amount of arrears.175 This election represents a significant 
policy shift from RURESA.176 
Within the allotted time frame, the non-registering party may "seek 
to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of 
noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies 
being sought or the amount of any alleged arrears."177 If a timely 
contest is filed, the registering tribunal must schedule a hearing and 
give notice* of the hearing to the parties.178 
The contesting party has the burden of proving one of the limited 
defenses available under the Act.179 These are: the issuing tribunal 
lacked personal jurisdiction; the order was obtained by fraud; the order 
has been vacated, suspended or modified by a later order; the issuing 
tribunal stayed the order pending appeal; satisfaction occurred in full 
or in part; there is a defense under the registering state's law to the 
specific remedy sought; the application of the statute of limitations 
precludes enforcement of some or all arrears. 
Counsel is likely to encounter litigants who believed a de novo 
RURESA order acted as a, modification of the original order for which 
1 7 5
 UIFSA § 608. 
^6 See, e.g., Chapman v. Chapman, 205 Cal. App. 3d 253, 252 Cal. Rptr. 359 
(1988) (cited in the official comments to § 608) (the obligor was not precluded from 
challenging the arrears amount alleged under the registered order; the court held that 
the 20-day period set out in the registration statute and the notice applied only to 
petitions contesting the confirmation of the registered order). 
1 7 7
 UIFSA § 606(a). 
173 UIFSA § 606(c). 
1 7 9
 UIFSA § 607(a). See, e.g. Villanueva v. Office of the Attorney General, 935 
S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Ct. App. 1996). Father contested a registration of an Indiana support 
order asserting, among other things, that the Indiana orders were "too ambiguous, 
indefinite and uncertain" and that he could not comply with the term requiring him 
to pay by military allotment as he was no longer in military service. He further claimed 
that the trial court erred in failing to order paternity testing before entering the 
arrearage judgment. The appellate court held that under the Full Faith and Credit 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the introduction of a facially valid foreign order 
creates a prima facie case for its recognition and enforcement. It can only be attacked 
on limited grounds; the burden of proof is on the party challenging the order. Neither 
non-paternity nor the fact that the underlying order is not enforceable by contempt 
is a defense to the validity or enforcement of a support order registered under UIFSA; 
Sheppard v. Sheppard, 1996 Va. App. Lexis 261 (permiting registration and 
enforcement of a North Carolina spousal support order in Virginia accompanied by 
a complaint for specific performance against the Virginia resident obligor). 
(Matthew Bender & Co . inc.) (Rel.23-10/97 Pub.37I) 
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registration and enforcement are sought. Yet it is unlikely the de novo 
aspect of RURESA was understood. Counsel is forewarned that an 
obligor who thought the order had been lowered and is now told that 
retroactive modification is precluded will be frustrated and angry.180 
If the obligor presents evidence of a full or partial defense, the 
tribunal may stay enforcement, continue the proceedings to permit 
production of additional relevant evidence, or enforce any uncontested 
portions of the registered order during a stay or continuance.1S1 If the 
contestant fails to establish a defense, the tribunal must issue an order 
confirming the registration.132 
[d] Registration and Modification 
Once the election was made to replace the de novo proceedings 
operating under RURESA with a "one order, one time, one place" 
approach to interstate litigation, drafting complexity was exponentially 
increased and the door was opened to complaints about policy choices. 
As stated earlier, UIFSA incorporates the concept of continuing and 
exclusive jurisdiction,1S3 under which only one state is granted the 
right to modify the existing support order. Part 3 of UEFSA Article 
6 governs. The concept is straightforward: so long as either of the 
individual parties or the child resides in the state that entered the 
original order, that state retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify its 
order, upon proper petition.184 In such circumstances, even" though 
a sister state's order has been registered for enforcement, the register-
ing state is precluded from modifying it. See § 48.03[8][a], supra. 
Where the individual parties and the child have left the issuing state,185 
or if the individual parties agree in writing to take the case to another 
180 See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9), requiring adoption of state laws in conformity with 
the so-called Bradley amendment, requiring full faith and credit with respect to child 
support arrears and precluding retroactive modification of support orders prior to filing 
and notice of a petition for modification. 
i s i UIFSA § 607(b). 
182 UIFSA § 607(c). 
i 8 3 Actually, two concepts are involved, not one: jurisdiction is both continuing 
and exclusive. This is a good mantra to keep in mind as one sorts through UIFSA. 
184 UIFSA § 611 (a) is the counterpart to § 205(b), which describes the attending 
circumstances when a state's continuing jurisdiction lapses. 
185 UIFSA § 611(a)(l)(i). 
(Maiihcw Bender &. Co . Inc.) (Re! 23-10/97 Pub.371) 
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state,186 UIFSA sets out a methodology for registering the support 
order in another state for purposes of modification.137 While either 
the obligor or obligee may seek a modification of the order, modifica-
tion must be sought in the jurisdiction of the opposing party.188 
The policy choice to require the petitioner in a modification action 
to be a non-resident of the forum state is intended in part to avoid 
"hometowning," common under RURESA and considered to be a chief 
reason for the decrease in the number of orders in interstate matters. 
UIFSA § 611(a), which applies to both obligors and obligees, provides 
a rough parity by placing the burden to litigate in a distant forum on 
the party who wishes to change a perfectly valid, enforceable order. 
For those attorneys, advocates and policy makers who prefer a 
"home state" rule for jurisdiction in child support cases, the non-
resident requirement of § 611(a) is unduly restrictive. They argue that 
when the nexus between the issuing state and the individual litigants 
and child is severed, a party seeking modification should be able to 
use UIFSA7 s long-arm provisions (contained in § 201) to obtain 
jurisdiction over a non-resident, rather than being forced to litigate 
in the opposing party's forum.189 Still, it is undeniable that UIFS A's 
non-residency requirement avoids the potential of a second round of 
1 8 6
 UIFSA § 611(b). If both parties agree to transfer jurisdiction, one has made 
a mistake. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (with Unofficial Annotations 
by John J. Sampson), 27 Fam. L.Q. 1, 162, n. 157 (ABA Spring 1993). 
iS7 UIFSA § 610. 
iss UIFSA § 611(a). UIFSA (1996) makes a two exceptions to this rule. First, if 
the issuing tribunal is a foreign jurisdiction which has not enacted laws or procedures 
substantially similar to UIFSA, consent otherwise reguired of the local resident is 
not required.UIFSA § 611 (a)(2). Second, and far more importantly, the drafters added 
§ 613, designed to permit registration for modification of a support order from a state 
lacking CEJ, into a state where both the individual parties reside. There is no 
corresponding requirement that the child reside in the forum state (although the child 
must have left the issuing state for CEJ to have lapsed). Because modification of an 
order in such circumstances is an intrastate matter, little off UHFSA applies—only 
Articles 1, 2 and 6. 
1 8 9
 The original Senate and House versions of welfare reform (H.R. 4) contained 
language that attempted to change this key UIFSA provision by mandating that states 
adopt alternate language when enacting UIFSA as a condition to receiving IV-D 
federal funds. Upon being advised of numerous concerns about this change, including 
objections to both the policy change and the language drafted, the conference bill 
deleted the change. See Federal Register, Nov. 15, 1995; Balanced Budget Act of 
1995, § 12321. 
(Matthew Bender & Co , lnc) (Rcl.23-10/97 Pub.371) 
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challenges to a support order occasioned by the use of long-arm 
jurisdictional provisions. 
Litigation should not prove unduly burdensome to the out-of-state 
party in light of UIFSA's evidentiary provisions.190 A party seeking 
modification is, however, subjected to the procedural and substantive 
laws of the opponent's state.191 Thus, an obligor who seeks to modify 
an existing support order when both parties and the child have left 
the issuing state must register the existing order for modification in 
the state with personal jurisdiction over the obligee. The registering 
state then will apply its own child support guidelines to the recalcula-
tions of the obligation and its own rules of modification, irrespective 
of the standard used to set the original order. The responding state 
cannot modify any provision of the order not subject to modification 
in the issuing state. Nor can it modify the duration of the support 
obligation. 
Under § 611(c), a tribunal cannot modify any aspect of a child 
support order that cannot be modified under the law of the issuing 
state. For example, if child support was ordered through age 21 in 
accordance with the law of the issuing state and the law of the forum 
state ends the support obligation at age 18, modification by the forum 
tribunal may not affect the duration fo the support order to age 21 1 9 2 
The process of registration for modification is similar to that for 
enforcement. See § 48.03 [8][a], supra. The petition for modification 
may be filed simultaneously with an enforcement registration or 
sometime thereafter, if the qualifying conditions are met. The pleading 
must specify the grounds for modification.193 The party obtaining the 
modification must, within 30 days unless the state selects another time 
frame, file a certified copy of the modified order with the issuing 
tribunal that had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction arid in each tribunal 
190UIFSA §§ 316, 317 and 318. 
191UIFSA § 610 
192 in Mario v. Lune, 1995 WL 131907 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995), the appellant-mother 
sought enforcement and modification of a New York child support order in California 
under URESA. In New York, the support obligation ends when a child reaches age 
21; in California, support ceases at age 18. The California court held that it could 
modify the order upward only until the child reached California's age of majority; 
thereafter, it could only enforce the New York order; any modification after the age 
of majority would take place in New York. 
193 UIFSA § 609. 
(Maiihcw Bender & Co , Inc ) (Rcl.23-10/97 Pub 371) 
